|
課程名稱 |
進階社會選擇與機制設計
Advanced Social Choice and Mechanism Design |
|
開課學期 |
103-1 |
|
授課對象 |
社會科學院 經濟學研究所 |
|
授課教師 |
金世旻 |
|
課號 |
ECON5113 |
|
課程識別碼 |
323EU8120 |
|
班次 |
|
|
學分 |
3 |
|
全/半年 |
半年 |
|
必/選修 |
選修 |
|
上課時間 |
星期二5,6,7(12:20~15:10) |
|
上課地點 |
社科402 |
|
備註 |
本課程以英語授課。
限學士班三年級以上 或 限碩士班以上
總人數上限：50人 |
|
Ceiba 課程網頁 |
http://ceiba.ntu.edu.tw/1031ECON5113_ |
|
課程簡介影片 |
|
|
核心能力關聯 |
核心能力與課程規劃關聯圖 |
|
課程大綱
|
|
為確保您我的權利,請尊重智慧財產權及不得非法影印
|
|
課程概述 |
This is an upper division and graduate level course on social choice and mechanism design theory. The course introduces the ideas and concepts of social choice and mechanism design theory and discusses the applications such as voting, allocation and matching. Students are expected to make a presentation about a paper from the reading lists and participate in class discussion. By the end of the term, students are expected to write and present their own research proposals. |
|
課程目標 |
Deep understanding social choice and mechanism design: After this class, students are expected to understand the key ideas, concepts and applications of social choice and mechanism design theory
Evaluate current important research: After this class, students are expected to develop the ability to read recent journal articles related to social choice and mechanism design theory and evaluate the quality of the papers. During class, students are expected to read assigned journal articles and book chapters and write a critical review of related papers. Also, students are expected to make a presentation of related papers in class.
Develop the ability of exploring an original idea: After this class, students are expected to have the ability to develop their own idea. During class, students are expected to write and present their own research proposals by the end of the term.
Course outline (Course Schedule of 18 weeks)
Social Choice Theory
Social choice function: Introduction (week 1)
Arrow’s impossibility theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (week 2)
Social choice with restricted preferences (week 3)
Mechanism Design Theory
Mechanism design: Introduction (week 4)
Dominant strategy implementation (week 5)
Implementation in Nash equilibria (week 6)
Bayesian implementation and mechanisms (week 7,8)
Robust mechanism design (week 9)
Applications
Voting (week 10-14)
Strategic behavior in voting (week 10)
Information aggregation in voting (week 11)
Forward-looking considerations: voting for voters, choosing institutions (week 12)
Pareto efficiency and incentive constraints (week 13)
Voting turn out (week 14)
Allocation: Efficiency and fairness (week 15)
Matching: School choice (week 16)
Presentations of Research Proposals (week 17,18)
|
|
課程要求 |
1) Referee reports (20%): Students must write two referee reports during the semester. Each report should critique a paper from the reading lists in the course syllabus or a paper with the permission of the instructor. It should be approximately 2 pages in length.
2) Presentation (40%): Students must make presentations about papers from the reading lists. The number of papers students present will depend on how many students enroll in the class.
3) Paper Proposal (40%): Students must write by the end of the term a paper proposal of approximately 5 pages in length. The proposal must include a research question, examples, methodology, related literature and references.
Feedback for other presenters should be emailed to the instructor and the TA who will compile them anonymously and send them to the presenters.
The topic and ideas for the research proposal should be discussed with the instructor in the middle of the term.
|
|
預期每週課後學習時數 |
|
|
Office Hours |
|
|
指定閱讀 |
|
|
參考書目 |
|
|
評量方式
(僅供參考) |
|
|